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Articles 
Not Enough Official Torture in the 
World? The Circumstances in Which 
Torture Is Morally Justifiable 
By MIRKO BAGARIC* AND JULIE CLARKE** , 
RECENT EVENTS stemming from the "war on terrorism" have high-
lighted the prevalence of torture, both as an interrogation technique 
and as a punitive measure.I Torture is almost universally deplored. It 
is" prohibited by international law and is not officially sanctioned by 
the domestic laws of any state.2 The formal prohibition against torture 
* B.A, LL.B. (with honors), lL.M., Ph.D., Head of Deakin La~ School. Professor 
Bagaric was a panelist at the U.S.F. Law Review's spring symposium, "Torture: When, If 
Ever, Is It Permissible?" Janis Karpinski, the commander of the military police brigade that 
oversaw Abu Ghraib prison, was the symposium's keynote speaker. The symposium also 
fe~tured a panel discussion and debate on the moral and legal permissibility of torture, 
which included Professor Bagaric, Professor Marcy Strauss of Loyola Law School, Los 
Angeles, and Professor John Parry of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Professor 
Bagaric would like to express his thanks for the assistance he received from the editorial 
team of the, U.S.F. Law Review, especially Kathryn Dittrick Heebner . 
. ",*' r.e~tuter, OeakiilLaw School. ;, 
1.' For the purposes of this Article, the "use of torture" refers to governmental use of 
torture and not to non-government actors. . 
2. Israel was the last state to officially sanction the practice. TOTSE.CoM, USE OF 
TORTURE AGAINST PALESTINIAN POLmCAL PRISONERS (Feb. 2000), at http://www.totse.com/ 
en/politics/the_world_beyond_the_usa/164142.html (last accessed Mar, 8, 2005). At least 
af~er the Landau Report of 1987, and for some time before, the nature of the conduct 
sanctioned by Israel was ambiguous, and precise interrogation methods were classified as 
secret. The Israeli Government denied that the interrogation methods employed 
amounted to torture. See, e.g., Nili Arad, Israeli Representative, Statement Before the 18th 
Session of United Nations Committee Against Torture (May 7, 1997), in ISRAEL MINISTRY 
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WEB SrrE, at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israel+ 
and™he+UN/Speeches+-§tatements/ (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005) [hereinafter Statement 
of Nili Arad]. Mter the Landau Report of 1987, the Israeli government only admitted to 
using "moderate physical pressure" and in some cases "enhanced physical pressure" for 
purposes of interrogation, still claiming that this did not amount to torture. In May 1998, 
however, the United Nations Committee Against Torture found that the interrogation 
methods used in Israel, of which it was aware, constituted torture. Conclusions and Recom-
mendations of the Committee Against Torture: Israe~ U.N. HCHR, 27th Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. 
58.1 
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is absolute-there are no exceptions to it. This is not only pragmati-
cally unrealistic, but unsound at a normative level. Despite the abso-
lute ban on torture, it is widely used. Contrary to common belief, 
torture is not the preserve of despot military regimes in third world 
nations. For example, there are serious concerns regarding the treat-
ment by the United States of senior Al Qaeda leader Khalid Shaikh 
Mohammad.3 There is also irrefutable evidence that the United States 
tortured large nU}.llbers of Iraqi prisoners, as well as strong evidence 
that it tortured prisoners at Guantanamo Bay prison in Cuba, where 
suspected Al Qae?-a terrorists are he1d.4 More generally Professor Alan 
Dershowitz has noted, "[C]ountries all over the world violate the Ge-
neva Accords [prohibiting torture]. They do it secretly and hypotheti-
cally, the way the. French did it in Algeria."5 
Dershowitz ~as also recently argued that torture should be made 
lawful. His argument is based on a harm minimization rationale from 
the perspective of victims of torture. He said, "Of course it would be 
best if we didn't use torture at all, but if the United States is going to 
continue to torture people, we need to make the process legal and 
accountable."9 Our argument goes one step beyond this. We argue 
that torture is indeed morally defensible, not just pragmatically desira-
CAT/C/XXVIl/Concl.5 (2001). Nevertheless, the practices continued without judicial in-
tervention until September 1999 when the Israeli Supreme Court ruled it illegaL Steve 
Weizman, Israel Uses Torture in Defiance of Court Ban, INDEPENDENT (London), Nov. 1~, 2001, 
available at http://news.independenLco.uk/world/middle_east/storyJsp?story=l04447 
(last accessed Apr. 18, 2005). Despite this ruling, it has been suggested that the Israeli 
authorities continue to use torture. Id. Ken Roth, the executive director of Human Rights 
Watch, suggests that Israel ended up torturing around ninety percent of its Palestinian 
security detainees until finally the Israeli supreme court outlawed the practice. Interview by 
Wolf Blitzer with Alan Dershowitz, Professor of Law, Harvard University, and Ken Roth, 
Dershowitl.: Torture Could Be Justified (Mar. 3, 2003), available at http://edition.cnn.com/ 
2003/LAW/03/03/cnna.Dershowitz (last accessed Apr. 18,2005) [hereinafter Dershowitz 
Interview] . 
3. See, e.g., Richard J. Wilson, United States Detainees at Guantanamo Bay: The Inter-Amer-
ican Commission on Human Rights Responds to a "Legal Black Hole", 10 HUM. RTs. BRIEF 2, 3-4 
(2003). 
4. Legal Definitions of Torture not Black and White, CNN, May 11, 2004, at http://www. 
cnn.com/2004/LAW/05/10/torture.1egal.ap (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005) ("The [U.S.] 
Defense Department is investigating more than forty cases of possible misconduct against 
civilians in Iraq and Mghanistan, including as many as twelve unjustified deaths. The CIA 
inspector general, meantime, is Jooking into three detainee deaths during or after interro-
gations with agency personnel."). 
5. Dershowitz Interview, supra note 2. 
6. James Silver, Why America's Top Liberal Lawyer Wants to Legalise Torture, SCOTSMAN 
(Scotland), May 22, 2004, available at http://thescotsman.scotsman.com/international. 
cfm?id=582662004 (laSt accessed Apr. 18, 2005) (quoting Alan Dershowitz). 
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ole. The harm minimization rationale is used to supplement our 
argument. 
While a "civilized" community does not typically condone such 
conduct, this Article contends that torture is morally defensible in cer-
tain circumstances, mainly when more grave harm can be avoided by 
using torture as an interrogation device. The pejorative connotation 
associated with torture should be abolished. A dispassionate analysis 
of the propriety of torture indicates that it is morally justifiable. At the 
outset of this analytical discussion, this Article requires readers to 
move from the question of whether torture is ever defensible to the 
issue of the circumstances in which it is morally permissible. 
Consider the following example: A terrorist network has activated 
a large bomb on one of hundreds of commercial planes carrying over 
three hundred passengers that is flying somewhere in the world at any 
point in time. The bomb is set to explode in thirty minutes. The 
leader of the terrorist organization announces this intent via a state-
ment on the Internet. He states that the bomb was planted by one of 
his colleagues at one of the major airports in the world in the past few 
hours. No details are provided regarding the location of the plane 
where the bomb is located. Unbeknown to him, he was under poliCe 
surveillance and is immediately apprehended by police. The terrorist 
leader refuses to answer any questions of the police, declaring that the 
passengers must die and will do so shortly. 
Who in the world would deny that all possible means should be 
used to extract the details of the plane and the location of the bomb?7 
The answer is not many.8 The passengers, their relatives and friends, 
and many in society would expect that all means should be used to 
7. "'Everybody says they're opposed to torture. But everyone would do it personally 
if they knew it could save the life of a kidnapped child who had only two hours of oxygen 
left before death. And it would be the right thing to do.'" Vicki Haddock, The Unspeakable: 
To Get the Truth, Is Torture or Coercion Ever Justified, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 18,2001, at D1 (quot-
ing Alan Dershowitz). 
8. A recent CNN poll indicated that of the 237,131 votes received, 47% indicated 
torture could be justified during interrogation in some circumstances. Poll: Is Torture Ever 
Justified During Interrogation?, CNN, May 26, 2004, at http://www.cnn.com/POLLSERVER/ 
results/10612.content.html (last accessed Mar. 22, 2005). A similar poll conducted by Ja-
pan Today asked whether respondents thought torture of captured terrorist suspects is ac-
ceptable if it leads to information that might prevent further attacks or take out terrorist 
leaders. Of 1,094 votes counted, 50.9% supported the use of torture in those circum-
stances. Poll: Do You Think Torture of Captured Terrorist Suspects Is Acceptable If It Leads to 
InformationThat Might Prevent Further Attacks M Take Out Terrorist Leaders?, JAPAN TODAY, May 
2004, at http://wwwJapantoday.com/e/?content=vote&id=157 (last accessed Apr. 18, 
2005). It should be noted that the hypothetical described is more extreme than those 
adverted to by the polls and hence is likely to generate more support. 
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extract the information, even if the pain and suffering imposed on the 
terrorist resulted in his death. 
Although the above example is hypothetical and is not one that 
has occurred in the real world, the force of the argument cannot be 
dismissed on that basis. As C.L. Ten notes, "fantastic examples" that 
raise funliamental issues for consideration, such as whether it is 
proper to torture wrongdoers, play an important role in the evalua-
tion of moral principles and theories.9 These examples sharpen con-
trasts and illuminate the logical conclusions of the respective 
. principles to test the true strength of our commitment to the princi-
ples.10 Thus, fantastic examples cannot qe dismissed summarily 
merely because they are "simply" hypothetical. 
Real life is, of course, rarely this clear cut, but there are certainly 
scenarios approaching this degree of despetation,H which raise for 
discussion whether it is justifiable to inflict barm on one person to 
reduce a greater level of harm occurring to a large number of blame-
less people. Ultimately, torture is simply the sharp end of conduct 
whereby the interests of one agent are sacrificed for the greater good. 
As a community, we are willing to accept this principle. Thus, al-
though differing in degree, torture is no different in nature from con-
duct that we sanction in other circumstances. It should be viewed in 
this light. 
Given this, it is illogical to insist on a blanket prohibition against 
torture. Therefore, the debate must turn to the circumstances when 
torture is morally appropriate. This is the topic of this Article. 
International law defines torture as severe pain and suffering, 
generally used as an interrogation device or as a punitive measure,12 
This Article focuses on the use of torture as an interrogation device 
9. C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT AND PUNISHMENT 18-~5 (1987). Ten draws a distinction 
between a fundamental moral principle (a principle that is not justified by reference to 
some further moral principle) and a secondary moral principle (that has to be justified by 
appeal to some further moral principle), and makes the point that fantastic examples play 
an importaht role in rehttion to the evaluation of fundamental moral principles. Id. at 20. 
10. Id. 
11. A situation akin to the above example would have arisen if police had appre-
hended the ring leader of the group responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks after 
the first plane crashed into the twin towers at New York City'S World Trade Center. 
12. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, GoA Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, pt. 1, art. 1, at 197, U.N. 
Doc.A/29/51 (1984) [hereinafter U.N. Convention Against Torture]. As a punitive mea-
sure, it could be argued that torturing wrongdoers will deter them and potential offenders 
from committing criminal acts. Thisjustlfication is unsound, given the empirical evidence 
does not support the view that inflicting harsher penalties' results in less crime. 
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and poses that the deVice is only permissible to prevent significant 
harm to others. !n these circumstances, there are five variables rele-
Vant in determining whether torture is permissible and the degree of 
torture that is appropriate. The variables are (1) the number of lives 
at risk; (2) the immediacy of the harm; (3) the availability of other 
means to acquire the information; (4) the level of wrongdoing of the 
agent; and (5) the likelihood that the agent actually does possess the 
relevant information. 
Part I of this Article analyzes the meaning of torture and the na-
ture and scope of the legal prohibition against torture. Part II exam~ 
ines whether torture .is' morally defensible. It is argued that torture is 
no different than other forms of morally permissible behavior and is 
justifiable on a utilitarian ethic. It is also argued that, on close reflec-
tion, torture is also justifiable. against a backdrop of a non-consequen-: 
tialist rights-based ethic, which is widely regarded as prohibiting 
torture in all circumstances. Thus, the Article concludes that torture is 
morally justifiable in rare circumstances, irrespective of which norma-
tive theory one adopts. Part III examines the circumstances in which 
torture is justifiable. Finally, Part IV debunks the argument that tor-
ture should not be legalized because it will open the floodgates to 
more torture. 
I. Torture: Reality and Legal Position 
A. The Law on Torture 
Pursuant to international law, "torture" is defined as: 
Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, 
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is 
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or 
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any 
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instiga-
tion of or with the corisent or acquiescence of a public official or 
other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain 
or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to la~ul 
sanctions.13 
Torture is prohibited by a number of international documents.14 It is 
also considered to carry a special status in customary international 
, 13. Id. 
14. Amnesty International has observed that "numerous new international standards 
have been adopted prohibiting torture and setting out governnients' obligations to prevent 
it. An impressive array of international human rights. mechanisms has been put in place to 
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law, that of jus cog ens, which is a "peremptory norm" of customary in-
ternational law. 15 The significance of this' is that customary interna-
tional law is binding on all states, even if they have not ratified a 
particular treaty. At the treaty level, there are both general treaties 
that proscribe torture and specific treaties banning the practice. 
In terms of general treaties, torture is prohibited by a number of 
international and regional treaties. These include Article 5 of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights (1948);16 Articles 7 and 10(1) of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966);17 Arti-
cle 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950);18 Article 
5(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights (1978);19 and Ar-
ticle 5 of the Mrican Charter on Human and People's Rights (1981).20 
In addition to these instruments, which set out a range of human 
rights, the international community has implemented specific treaties 
addressing torture. The main treaties are the U.N. Convention 
Against Torture (1984); the European Convention for the Prevention 
of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(1987) ;21 and the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish 
Torture (1985).22 
The rigidity of the rule against torture' is exemplified by the fact 
that it has a non-derogable status in human rights law. That is, there 
are no circumstances in which torture is permissible. This prohibition 
is made clear in Article 2(2) of the U.N. Convention Against Torture, . 
press states to live up to their commitments." AMNESlY INT'L, TORTURE WORLDWIDE: AN 
AFFRONT TO HUMAN DIGNITY 2 (2000) [hereinafter AMNESlY INT'L, TORTURE WORLDWIDE]. 
For an excellent overview of the prohibition against torture, see CoNOR FOLEY, COMBATING 
TORTURE: A MANUAL FOR JUDGES & PROSECUTORS §§ 1.9-1.10, available atwww.essex.ac.uk/ 
combatingtorturehandbook/manual (last accessed Feb. 13, 2005). Much of the foregoing 
overview of the law of torture is derived from this source. 
15. General Comment on Issues &lating to Reservations Made upon Ratification or Actession 
to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols Thereto, or in &lation to Declarations Under Article 41 of 
the Covenant, V.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment 24, at 52, para. 10, V.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.6 (1994). 
16. GA Res. 217 A(II1), U.N. Doc. A/81O at 71 (1948) [hereinafter VDHR]. 
17. GA Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21stSess., Supp.16, at 52, U.N. Doc.A/6316 
(1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
18. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Sept. 3, 1953,213 U.N.T.S. 222. 
19. Nov. 22, 1969, 1114 V.N.T.S. 1243, reprinted in 91.L.M. 675 (1970). 
20. June 27, 1981, O.A.V. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 
(1982). 
21. E.T.S. No. 126 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990), reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1152 (entered into 
force Feb. 1, 1989). 
22. Feb. 28, 1987, OAS. Treaty Series No. 67, at 83, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.l, 
reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 519 (1986). 
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which states, "No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a 
s,tate of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any-other 
p~b.lioe:thergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture."23 
Thus, the right not to be tortured is absolute. . 
There are no circumstances in which states can set aside or restrict 
this obligation, even in times of war or other emergency threaten-
ing the life of the nation, which may justify the suspension or limi-
tation of some other rights. States are also restricted from making 
derogations which may put individuals at risk of torture or ill-treat-
ment-for example, by allowing excessive periods of incommuni-
cado detention or denying a detainee prompt access to a court. 
This prohibitjon operates irrespective of circumstances or attrib-
utes, such as :me status of the victim or, if he or she is a criminal 
suspect, upon the crimes that the victim is suspected of having 
committed. ' 
State officials' are prohibited from inflicting, instigating or tolera~­
ing the torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment of any person. An order from a superior officer or a 
public authority may not be invoked as a justification for torture. 
States are also required to ensure that all acts of torture are of-
fences under their criminal law, establish criminal jurisdiction over 
such acts, investigate all such acts and hold those responsible for 
committing ~em to account.24 
This absolute prohibition is frequently highlighted by Amnesty 
International and other human rights organizations. For example, 
Amnesty International states, "The law is unequivocal-torture is ab-
solutely prohibited in all circumstances .... The right to be free from 
torture is absolute. It cannot be denied to anyone in - any 
circumstances."25 
. Torture is also prohibited as a war crime, pursuant to humanita-
rian law.26 In addition, torture is considered to be a crime against hu-
manity when the acts are perpetrated as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack against a civilian population, whether or not they are 
committed in the course of an armed conflict.27 
23. V.N. Convention Against Torture, supra note 12, at pt. 1, art. 2. 
24. FoLEY, supra note 14. 
25. AMNES'IY INT'L, TORTURE WORLDWIDE, supra note 14, at 10. 
26. See, e.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Anned Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 12 & 50, 75 V.N.T.S. 
38, 62; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick 
and Shipwrecked Members of Anned Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 12 & 51, 75 
V.N.T.S 94, 116; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 
12, 1949, arts. 13, 14, 87 & 130, 75 V.N.T.S. 146, 148, 202, 238. 
27. Thus, Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), includes torture and rape within the International Criminal 
Court's jurisdiction. 
588 UNIVERSI1Y OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
B. The Reality of Torture 
As witJ:! many legal precepts, the black letter law must be consid-
ered against the context of reality. As this part shows, various forms of 
torture are used despite the legal prohibition of it. . 
1. Forms of Torture 
As is noted by Dershowitz, torture comes in many different forms 
and intensities: 
Torture is a continuum and the two extremes are on the one hand 
torturing someone to death-that is torturing an enemy to death 
so that others will know that if you are caught, you will be caused 
excruciating pain-that's torture as a deterrent .... At the other 
extreme, there's non-lethal torture which leaves only psychological 
scars. The perfect example of this is a sterilised needle inserted 
under the fingernail, causing· unbearable pain but no possible 
long-term damage. These are very different phenomena. What they 
have in common of course is that they allow the government physi-
cally to come into contact with you in orde,r to produce pain.28 
Various methods of torture have and continue to be applied in a 
multitude of countries. The most common methods are beating, elec-
tric shock, rape and sexual abuse, mock execution or threat of death, 
and prolonged solitary confinement.29 Other common methods in-
clude sleep and sensory deprivation, suspension of the body,30 "shack-
ling interrogees in contorted painful positions" or in "painful 
stretching positions,"31 and applying pressure to sensitive areas, such 
as the "neck, throat, genitals, chest and head. "32 
2. The Benefits of Torture: An Effective Infonnation Gathering 
Device 
The main benefit of torture is that it is an excellent means of 
gathering information. Humans have an intense desire to avoid pain, 
no matter how short term, and most will co~ply with the demands of 
a torturer to avoid the pain. Often even the threat of torture alone will 
28. Silver, supra note 6. 
.. 29. AMNEsTY INT'L, TORTURE WORLDWIDE, supra note 14, at 10. 
30. Id. 
31. ALLEGRO PACHECO, PUBUC COMMITIEE AGAINST TORTURE IN ISRAEL, PROVING TOR-
TURE: No LoNGER NECESSARY IN ISRAEL (1999), at http://internationalstudies.uchicago. 
edu/torture/abstracts/allegrapacheo.html(last accessed Apr. 16,2005). 
32. See id. Many ofthese."methods" are alleged to have been used in the interrogation 
of prisoners by United States military personnel in Abu Ghraib prison, Iraq. See Scott 
Higham & Joe Stephens, Secret Detainee statements Reveal Savagery of Abu Ghraib, AGE (Austl.), 
May 22, 2004, at 17; Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, NEwYORKER,May 10, 2004, 
at 42. 
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evoke cooperatiQn. To this end, Dershowitz cites a recent kidnapping 
case in Gennany in which the son of a distinguished banker was kid-
napped.33 The eleven-year-old boy had been missing for three days. 
The police had in their custody a man they were convinced had per-
petrated the kidnapping. The man was taken into custody after being 
seen collecting a ransom that was paid by the boy's family.34 During 
seven hours of interrogation the man "toyed" with police, leading 
them to· one false location after another.35 Mter exhausting all lawful 
means of interrogation, the deputy commissioner of the Frankfurt po-
lice instructed his officers, in writing, that they could try to extract-
infonnation "by'means of the infliction of pain, under medical super-
vision and subject to prior warning."36 Ten minutes after the warning 
was given the suspect told the police where the boy was; unfortunately 
the boy was a~ready dead, having been killed shortly after the 
kidnapping. 37 . 
3. The Widespread Use of Torture 
a. Torture Around the World 
Despite the contemporary abhorrence against it, dozens of coun-
tries continue to use torture. A study of 195 countries and territories 
by Amnesty International between 1997 and mid-2000 found reports 
of torture or ill-treatment by state officials in more than 150 coun-
tries38 and in more than seventy countries that torture or ill-treatment 
was reported as:"widespread or persistent."39 It is also clear that tor-
33. Silver, supra.note 6. 
34. Peter Finn, Police Torture Threat SParkS Painful Debate in Germany, WASH. POST, Mar. 
8, 2003, at A19. 
35. John Hooper, Germany &eked by Torture Controversy, AGE (Austl.), Feb. 28, 2003, at 
http://theage.com.au/articles/2003/02/27 /1046064162443.html (last accessed Apr. 18, 
2005). 
36. Finn, supra note 34., 
37. Police Threat Fuels Debate on Torture, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Germany), Feb. 24, -2003, at 
http://www.dw-world.de/eng1ish/0.3367.1430_A_785751.00.html (last accessed Apr. 18, 
2005). The precise nature of the warning is not clear. The kidnapper has alleged that he 
was told a specialist was being flown to Frankfurt who could inflict on him "pain of the sort 
[he] had never before experienced." Hooper, supra note 35. The police deputy commis-
sioner has denied this account but admitted that it was made very plain to the suspect that 
they would hurt him until he "identified the whereabouts of the child." Id. The suspect 
ple.aded guilty at trial, was pronounced guilty of abduction, murder, and blackmail, and 
sentenced to life in prison. Associated Press, Schoolboy's Killer Gets Life Sentence, INT'L HER-
ALD TRIB., July 29, 2003, at http://www.iht.com/articles/10439.3.html (last accessed Apr. 
18,2005). 
38. AMNESTY INT'L, TORTURE WORLDWIDE, supra note 14, at 2. 
39. Id. at 3. Further, the report concluded that in more than eighty countries people 
were reported to have died as a result of being tortured. Amn~sty International believes 
590 UNIVERSIlY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
t~re is not limited to military regimes in third world nations. Amnesty 
IP.temational recently reported that in 2003 it had received reports of 
torture and ill-treatment from 132 countries, including the United 
States, Canada,Japan, France, Italy, Spain, and Germany.40 Israel, for 
example, officially sanctioned interrogation practices deemed by the 
U.N. Committee Against Torture to constitute torture41 until a deci-
sion of the Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court of Jus-
tice, in September 1999, ruled a number of these interrogations 
unlawful absent any clear statutory authorization.42 Prior to the Israeli 
Supreme Court ruling, the U.N. Committee Against Torture made the 
followirig obseIVations in relation to Israeli interroga~on techniques: 
[1'] he methods of interrogation, which were described' by non-gov-
ernmental organizations on the basis of accounts given to them by 
interrogatees and appear to be applied systematically, were neither 
confirmed nor denied by Israel. The Committee must therefore 
assume them to be accurate. Those methods inclUde: (1) re-
straining in very painful conditions, (2) hooding under special 
conditions, (3) sounding of loud music for prolonged periods, 
that this figure "underestimates" the extent of torture that exists. Id. at 2-3. In its most 
recent report, Amnesty claims that "victims of torture and ill-treatment by security forces, 
police and other state authorities were reported in 132 countries." AM;NESTY INT'L, INTRO· 
DUCTION: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REpORT 2004, at http://web.amnesty.org/report2004/ 
index-eng (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005). 
40. AMNESTY INT'L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REpORT 2004: TOR"LURE AND ILL-TREAT-
MENT, available at http://www.amnesty.org/resources/report04/stats-eng/text/03.html 
(last accessed Apr. 18,2005). The United States, Canada, Japan, France, Italy, Spain, and 
Germany have all ratified the U.N. Convention Against Torture. See OFFICE OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, RATIFICATIONS AND RESERVATIONS, at http:// 
www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/9.htm (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005). 
41. Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against Turture: Israe~ U.N. HCHR, 
27th Sess., U.N. Doc. CAT/C/XXVII/Concl.5 (2001), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/ 
tbs/ doc.nsf/ (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005) i see also John T. Parry & Welsh S. White, Interro-
gating Suspected Terrorists: Should Turture Be an option?, 63 U. PITT. L. REv. 743, 757-60 
(2002). The Israeli Government denied the force used in interrogations of Palestinians 
constituted torture, claiming that the "State of Israel categorically deplores and prohibits 
the practice of torture, including ... against persons under interrogation. Torture is pro-
hibited under Israel Law ... investigators are never, and never have been, authorized to 
use torture, even if its use might possibly prevent some terrible attacks and save human 
lives." Statement of Nili Arad, supra note 2. Instead, the Israel government, while accepting 
the "prohibition on torture is absolute" claimed that the interrogation techniques used, 
which might involve the use of "moderate physical pressure" did not contravene that prohi-
bition. Id. .' 
42. Not all forms of physical interrogation were banned as illegal. In particular, meth-
ods-including sleep deprivation-are allowed if incidental to the interrogation process 
and the defense of necessity might be available to interrogators who use physical pressure. 
AMNESTY INT'L USA, COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE SAYS ISRAEL's POLICY OF CLOSURES AND 
DEMOLrrIONS OF PALESTINIAN HOMES MAy AMOUNT TO CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING 
TREATMENT (2001), at http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/2001/israell1232001.html (last 
accessed Apr. 18, 2005). 
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(4) sleep deprivation for prolonged periods, (5) threats, including 
death threats, (6) violent shaking, and (7) using cold air to chill, 
and are, in the Committee's view, breaches of article 16 and also 
constitute torture as defined in article 1 of the Convention. This 
conclusion is particularly evident where such methods of interroga-
tion are used in combination, which appears to be the standard 
case.43 
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Despite the Court's ruling, there is little doubt that the practice 
of torture by the Israeli government continues.44 This may have been 
facilitated by the Court's comments that it would accept, in appropri-
ate circumstances, that Israel's General Security Service investigators 
might "avail themselves of the 'necessity' defense, if criminally;in-
dicted," for using the banned interrogation methods.45 One report 
cites official statistics between September 1999 and July 2002 that indi-
cate that during that time ninety Palestinians were defined as "ticking 
bombs" and thus subject to interrogation methods that would consti-
tute torture under internationallaw.46 
Indeed, a recent detailed study of forty-eight Palestinian detain-
ees found that interrogees were, in various combinations, frequently 
beaten, slapped or kicked, bent and placed in painful positions, vio-
lently shaken, deprived of sleep, shackled behind their backs for pro-
longed periods of cases, cursed at, threatened, degraded, and 
deprived of essential needs, including food, water, and medical care 
43. Concluding Observations of the Committee Against Torture: Israe~ U.N. HCHR, U.N. 
Doc. A/52/44 (1997), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/ (last accessed Apr. 
18, 2005). 
44. See generaUy Associated Foreign Press, Israeli Forces Increasing Use of Torture, GLOBAL 
EXCHANGE, Nov. 21, 2001, at http://www.globalexchange.org/countries/palestine/news 
200l/afp1l2101.htrnl.pf (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005); see alsoYuvAL GINBAR, PUBUC COMM. 
AGAINST TORTURE IN ISRAEL, BACK TO A ROUTINE OF TORTURE: TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT 
OF PALESTINIAN DETAINEES DURING ARREST, DETENTION AND INTERROGATION-SEPTEMBER 
200l-APRIL 2003. 
45. Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel, 38 I.L.M. 1471, 1486 
(1999). Parry and White have recently advocated the introduction of a "necessity" defense 
for torture in the United States. They argue that while torture should never be authoriied, 
a defense of "necessity" should be available to a government agent using torture if that 
agent can prove his actions "were necessary to avert a greater, imminent harm." Parry & 
White, supra note 41, at 762-63. We suggest that there is little practical difference between 
authorizing torture prior to the act and effectively authorizing it by providing the perpetra-
tors with legal defense after the act, save that it makes it more difficult for interrogators to 
determine when their actions are justifiable. Parry and White believe this to be a positive, 
suggesting that either ignorance of the availability of the defense or uncertainty about 
whether the defense would be available would promote deterrence. Id. It is dubious logic, 
powever, to enact a law that relies on ignorance or ambiguity to achieve the desired result 
46. These are referred to by the authorities as "exceptional means of interrogation." 
GINBAR, supra note 44, at 17. 
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amongst other things.47 In more tha~ seven:ty percent of cases, three 
or more of these methods were applied.48 Extrapolating from this and 
official data of the number of Palestinian detainees, the study esti-
mated that each month in Israel "ill-treatment reaching the level of 
torture as defined in international law is inflicted in dozens of cases, 
and possibly more."49 
The widespread use of torture is also clearly demonstrated by 
even a cursory reading of the most recent U.S. Department of State 
Country Information Reports. For example, the report on Turkey pro-
vides that torture, beatings, and other abuses by security forces remain 
widespread. 50 
Security forces reportedly killed 43 persons during the year . . . . 
Security forces continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention, al-
though the number of such incidents declined .... The rarity of 
convictions and the light sentences imposed on police and other 
security officials for killings and tortUre continued to foster a cli-
mate of impunity. Prosecutions brought by the Government in 
State Security Courts (SSCs) reflected a legal structure that favored 
government interests over individual rights. . . . Police beat, 
abused, detained, and harassed some demonstrators.51 
Likewise, the assessment on Pakistan states: 
Security force personnel continued to torture persons in custody 
throughout the country. For example, according to Human Rights 
Watch (HRW) , Rasheed Azam was beaten and tortured at Illiuzdar 
military cantonment. In September, two prison officials allegedly 
beat and killed 18-year-old Sunil Samuel at Camp Jail in Lahore 
after he was sexually assaulted by inmates. Over the years, there 
have been allegations that common torture method~ included: 
Beating; burning with cigarettes; whipping the soles of the feet; 
sexual assault; prolonged isolation; electric shock; denial of food or 
sleep; hanging upside down; forced spreading of the legs with bar 
fetters; and public humiliation.52 
In relation to China, the report asserts: 
The law prohibits torture; however,pplice and other elements of 
the security apparatus employed torture and degrading treatment 
47. Id. at 20. 
48. !d. at 2l. 
49. [d. at 22. 
50. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TuRKEY: COUNTRY REpORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES-
2003, at 1 (Feb. 25, 2004) (on file with U.S.F. Law Review) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF 
STATE, TuRKEY]; see also AMNESTY INT'L USA, TuRKEY: AN END TO TORTURE AND IMPUNITY Is 
OvERDUE! (Oct. 2001), at http://www.amnestyusa.org/ stoptortuHV turkey _tortureJeport. 
rtf (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005). 
5l. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE: TuRKEY, supra note 50, at 1. 
52. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PAKISTAN: COUNTRY REpORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES-
2003, at 5 (Feb. 25, 2004) (on file with U.S.F. Law Review). 
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in dealing with some detainees and prisoners. The Prison Law for-
bids prison guards from extorting confessions by torture, insulting 
prisoners' dignity, and beating or encouraging others to beat pris-
oners. While senior officials acknowledged that torture and co-
erced confessions were chronic problems, they did not take 
sufficient measures to end these practices. Former detainees re-
ported credibly that officials used electric shocks, prolonged peri-
ods of solitary confinement, incommunicado detention, beatings, 
shackles, and other forms of abuse. Recommendations from the 
May 2000 report of the U.N. Committee Against Torture still had 
not been fully implemented by year~s end. These recommenda-
tions included incorporating a definition of torture into domestic 
law, abolishing all forms of administrative detention (including re-
education through labor), promptly investigating all allegations of 
torture, and providing training courses on international humarr 
rights standards for police. During the year, police use of torture to 
coerce confessions from criminal suspects continued to be a prob-
lem. The 2002 death. in custody of ZengLingyun of Chongqing 
Municipality remained unresolved. On July 26, 2002, public secur-
ity pers~mnel detained Zeng on theft charges. On July 28, his fam~ 
ily was 'informed that he had died. Local officials initially told 
Zeng's family that he had been shot by police, and the family no-
ticed extensive bruises and a bullet wound on the body. Since the 
crackdown on Falun Gong began in 1999, there reportedly have 
been several hundred deaths in custody of Falun Gong adherents, 
due to torture, abuse, and neglect.53 
In the Philippines a similar picture emerges: 
The Constitution prohibits torture, and evidence obtained 
througq its use is inadmissible in court; however, members of the 
security forces and police continued to use torture and to abuse 
suspects and detainees. The CRR [Commission on Human Rights] 
provides the police with mandatory human rights training, includ-
ing primers on the rights of suspects, and higher level PNP [Philip-
pine National Police] officials seemed more receptive to respecting 
the human rights of detainees; however, rank-and-file awareness of 
the rights of detainees remained inadequate. 
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TFDP [The NGO Task Force Detainees of the Philippines] stated that 
torture remained an ingrained part of the arrest and detention pro-
cess. Common forms of abuse during arrest and interrogation report-
edly included striking detainees and threatening them with guns. Less 
common forms included the placing of plastic bags over heads to de-
53. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CHINA (INCLUDES TIBET, HONG KONG, AND MACAU): COUNTRY 
REpORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES-2003, at 7 (Feb. 25, 2004) (on file with U.S.F: Law 
Review)· [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CHINA] (cita!ions omitted); see also AMNESTY 
INT'L USA, TORTURE-A GROWING SCOURGE IN CHINA (Feb. 2001), at http://www.amnesty 
usa.org/inteIfaith/documentdo?id=5DE714C0187DFD31~02569DDO041B35C. 
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prive the detainee of air. TFDP reported that arresting officers often 
carried out such beatings in the early stages of detention. 54 
h. The United States in Iraq, Mghanistan, and Guantamamo Bay 
The United States has also been widely engaged in the practice of 
torture in the context of the "war against terrorism." Most recently, 
graphic photographs of the torture of Iraqi prisoners occurring at 
Abu Ghraib have spread around the world. 55 The photographs show 
prisoners bound in painful positions, placed in stress positions, such 
as being made to stand with arms outstretched, and forced into sexu-
ally humiliating positions. 56 Other abuses, reported by Major General 
Antonio Taguba in a secret report in March 2004, included pouring 
cold water on naked prisoners, beating inmates with a broom handle 
and chair, threats of rape, sodomy with a chemical light, using dogs to 
frighten and intimidate detainees, and f~rcing detainees to engage in 
sexually humiliating condu~t, such as being arranged in "sexually ex-
plicit positions for photogrilphing,"57 
In addition to the widely publicized photographs of torture oc-
curring at the Abu Ghraib facility in Baghdad, Amnesty International, 
the International Committee of the Red Cross, and a variety of other 
commentators have reported numerous other instances of torture by 
United States personnel since the beginning of the "war on terror." 
Instances of torture have been reported primarily in Mghanistan, 
Iraq, and Guantanamo Bay, suggesting that the Abu Ghraib incidents 
were not merely isolated caSes.58 Among other case studies, Amnesty 
54. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PHlLUPINES: COUNTRY REpORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRAC-
TICEs-2003, at 4 (Feb. 25, 2004) (on file with U.S.F; Law Review). 
55. See generally Shock, Outrage Over Prison Photos, CNN, May 1, 2004, at http://www. 
cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meastj04/30/iraq.photos/ (last accessed Apr. 18,2005). 
56. Id. -
57. M.G. ANTONIO M. TAGUBA~:T AL., ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH Mru-
TARY POUGY BRIGADE 16-18 (2004), reprinted at BBC NEWS WEB SITE, http://news.bbc.co. 
uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/10_5_04_tagubareport.pdf (last accessed Apr. 18,2005). 
This report of the investigation conducted by M~or General Taguba is nevertheless la-
beled "Secret/No Foreign Dissemination" but has been published on the BBC News web 
site. See also Report Into Baghdad Prison Abuse, BBC NEWS (U.K.), May 5, 2004, at http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3684825.stm (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005). 
58. AMNESTY INT'L, IRAQ: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REVEALS A PATTERN OF TORTURE AND 
ILL-TREATMENT (May 26, 2004), at http://weh.amnesty.org/web/web.nsf/pmt/irq-torture-
eng (last accessed Apr. 18,2005); see also Susan Sontag, Regarding the Torture of Others, N.Y. 
TIMES, LATE EDITION, May 23, 2004, at 25; AMNESTY INT'L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REpORT 
2004: IRAQ 3, at http://web.amnesty.org/web/web.nsf/print/2004-irq-summary-eng (last 
accessed Apr. 18, 2005); David Barrett, Fresh Bid to Bring Home Guantanamo Britons, SCOTS-
MAN, May 27, 2004, at http://news.scotsman.com/latest.cfm?id=2985571 (laSt accessed 
Apr. 18, 2005); Ken Coates, The Creeping Sickness, GUARDIAN (U.K) , Mar. 13,2004, available 
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cites· the treatment of Khreisan Khalis Aballey, who was arrested at his 
home in Baghdad in April 2003. Amnesty claims that 
[d]uring his interrogation at Baghdad's airport detention facility, 
he was made to stand or kneel facing a wall for seven-and-a-half 
days, hooded, and handcuffed tightly .... At the same time, a 
bright light was placed next to his hood whilst distorted music was 
played. Throughout this period, he was deprived of sleep and fell 
unconscious some of the time. He reported that at one time a US 
soldier stamped on his foot, tearing off one of his toenails. The 
prolonged kn~eling made his knees bloody .... 59 
In another case in April 2003, Abdallah Khudhran al-Shamran 
was reported to have been subjected to beatings and electric shoc;:ks as 
well· as other torture methods, including sleep deprivation through 
playing constant loud music and "being suspended from his leg~ and 
having his penis tied. "60 . 
Even domestically, and prior to the "war on terror," the ;D.N. 
Committee on Torture claimed that American police officers and 
prison guards had engaged in various forms of torture and ill treat-
ment on numerous occasions.61 Of particular concern was the use of 
electro-shock stun belts to restrain prisoners.62 In addition, the United 
States has been H:peatedly accused of turning over prisoners to other 
countries to have them tortured.63 Orie official said, "We don't kick 
the [expletive] out of them. We send them to other countries so they 
. -
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/guantanarno/story/0.13743.1168592.00.html (last accessed 
Apr. 18, 2005); James Grubel, Lawyer Backs Minister's Torture Claim, ADVERTISER (Austl.), 
May 19, 2004, .at http://www.theadvertiser.news.com.au/common/story_page/0.5963,96 
90288%255E911,00.html (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005); Patrick Martin, Soldier Beaten at 
Guantanamo in Interrogation Training, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE, May 29, 2004, at http:// 
wwW.wsws.org/articles/2004!may2004/guan-m29.shtml (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005); see 
gemraUy AMNEsrr INT'L, AMNEsrr INTERNATIONAL REpORT 2004: UNITED STATES OF .AMERICA, 
at http://web.amnesty.org/web/web.nsf/print/2004-usa-summary-eng (last accessed Apr. 
18, 2005). . 
59. AMNEsrr INT'L USA, IRAQ: HUMAN RIGlITS PROTEcnON AND PROMOTION VITAL IN 
THE TRANsmoNAL PERIOD, at http://www.arnnestyusa.org/women/document.do?id=2305 
5999CF853CD680256E~60052AEIC (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005). 
60. ·Id. 
61. Elif Kaban, The United Nations Rebukes the U.S. Over Brutality in Prisons, REUTERS, 
M~y 15, 2000, at http://www.prisons.org/un.htm (last accessed Api. 18, 2005); see also Ja-
ffiIe Fellner, Commentary, Prisoner Abuse: HowDiffei-ent Are U.S. Prisons?, HUM. RTS. WATCH, 
May 14, 2004, at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/05/14/usdom8583.htm (last ac-
cessed Apr. 18, 2005). . 
62. See Kaban, supra note 61. 
A2. 63. See,. e.g., The Legal Prohibition Against Torture, HUM. RTS. WATCH, Mar. II, 2003, at 
D 
,Dana Pnest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations, WASH- POST, 
ec. 26, 2002, at A01. 
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can kick the [expletive] out of them."64 In terms of the prevalence of 
torture in the United States, Dershowitz has noted: 
Many of the countries who are signatories to the various conven-
tions routinely torture .... Egypt, Jordan and the Philippines are 
signatories-we know those countries torture. How do we know? 
Because the United States sends our detainees to those countries 
to have them tortured. Hypocrisy is prevailing today. My suggestion 
is that if the United States were to authorise torture, we would have 
to write a letter to the various signatory organisations saying we 
reserve the right under the convention to exclude the following 
from the definition of torture ... and then we'd list our 
exceptions.65 
It is very easy to multiply !hese examples of torture,66 but enough has 
been said to emphasize the distinction between reality and rhetoric 
regarding torture. 
II. Moral Theory 
Broadly, there are two types of normative moral theories. Conse-
quential moral theories claim that an act is right or wrong depending 
upon its capacity to maximize a particular virtue, such as happiness. 
Non-consequential (or deontological) theories claim that the appro-
priateness of an aGtion is not contingent upon its instrumental ability 
to produce particUlar end~, but rather follows from the intrinsic fea-
tures of the act. Thus, the notion of absolute (or near absolute) rights, 
which now dominates moral discourse, is generally thought to sit most 
comfortably· in a non-consequentialist ethic. This section proves that 
torture is permissible pursuant to both of these ethical theories. It is 
onlyconsequentialist theones, however, that provide a logical frame-
64. Priest & Gellman, supra note 63,; at A02. 
65. Silver, supr{l note 6. 
66. See, e.g., AMNEs'IY INT'L, ALBANIA: TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT-AN END TO IMPU-
NITY (May 18, 2001), at http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/print/EURll0012001?OpenDocu-
ment (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005); AMNES'IY INT'L, BANGLADESH: TORTURE & IMPUNITY 
(Nov. 29, 2000), at http://web.imriesty.org/library/print/engasa130072000?open&of= 
Eng-bgd (last accessed Apr. 18, 2005); AMNES'IY INT'L, EGYPT: TORTURE REMAINS RIFE AS 
ClUES FOR JUSTICE Go UNHEEDED (Feb. 2001), at http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/ 
MDE120012001?OpenDocument&of=COUNTRIES\EGYPT (laSt accessed Apr.18, 2005); 
AMNES'IY !NT'L USA, MEXICO: JUSTICE BETRAYED-TORTURE IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM (June. 
2001), at http://www.amnestyusa.org/stoptorture/mexicojustice_betrayed.pdf (last ac-
cessedApr. 18,2005); RENATA CAPEiLA & MICHAEL SFARD, PUB. COMM, AGAINST TORTURE IN 
ISRAEL ("PCATI") & PALESTINIAN SOC'Y FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS & THE 
ENV'T ("LAW'), THE AsSASSINATION 'POLICYOF THE STATE OF ISRAEL: NOVEMBER 2000-:JANU-
ARY 2002 (May 2002). For a more general discussion of the extent torture see AMNES'IY 
INT'L, TORTURE WORLDWIDE, supra note 14. 
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work within which it is possible to demarcate the circumstances in 
which torture is permissible. 
Prior to discussing how torture sits in the context of these theo-
ries, an overview of the essential aspects of each of the theories is first 
discussed. 
A. N on-Consequentialist Rights-Based Theories 
The main argument in support of rights-based moral theories is 
aptly stated by John Rawls who claims that only rights-based theories 
take seriously the distinction between human beings and protect <;er-
tain rights and int~rests that are so paramount that they are beyond 
the demands of net happiness.67 
1. The Proliferation of Rights Talk 
Charges of this-nature have been extremely influential. Following 
the Second World War, there has been an immense increase in rights 
talk,68 both in sheer volume and the number of supposed rights. The 
rights doctrine has progressed a long way since its original modest aim 
of providing "a legitimization of ... claims against tyrannical or ~x­
ploiting regimes."69-As Tom Campbell points out, "The human rights 
movement is based on the' need for a counter-ideology to combat the 
abuses and misuses-of political authority by those who invoke, as a 
justification for their activities; the need to subordinate the particular 
interests of individuals to the general goOd."70 
There is now, more than ever, a strong tendency to advance 
moral claims and arguments in te:r:rUs of rights.71 Assertion of rights 
has become the customary means to express moral sentiments: 
"[T]here is virtually no area of public controversy in which rights are 
not to be found on at least one side of the question-and generally on 
both."72 There is no question that "the doctrine of human rights has 
67. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 27-28 (Harvard Univ. Press 1971). 
68. See TOM CAMPBELL, THE LEGAL THEORY OF ETHICAL POSITIVISM 161-88 (1996) (dis-
cussing the near universal trend towards bills of rights and constitutional rights as a focus 
for political choice). 
69. Stanley I. Benn, Human Rightl-For,Whom.andFor What?, inHUMAN RIGHTS 59, 61 
(Eugene Kamenka & Alice Erh-Soon Tay eds., 1978). 
70. Tom Campbell, Realizing Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM RHETORIC TO 
REALITY 1, 13 (Tom Campbell et al. eds., 1996). 
71. This is almost to the point where it is not too far off the mark to propose that the 
"escalation of rights rhetoric is out of control." L. WAYNE SUMNER, THE MORAL FOUNDATION 
OF RIGHTS 1 (1987); 
72. [d. 
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at least temporarily replaced the doctrine of maximizing utilitarianism 
as the prime philosophical inspiration of political ~ and social 
reform."73 
2. Rights Documents 
The influence of rights-based theories is demonstrated by the 
sheer number of international human rights instruments that most 
nations have signed or ratified. The main three of such instruments 
are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,74 and the Interna-
tional Coyenant on Civil and Political Rights. There are doz"ens of 
rights that are prescribed in one form or another by at least one of 
these doc!uments. The scope of these rights includes what can be de-
scribed as basic protections, such as the right to life,75 liberty, and 
security of person, 76 and to be free from torture or cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment.77 There are also the somewhat 
vaguer rights, such as the right to the economic, social, and cultural 
rights that are said to be indispensable to one's dignity" and the free 
development of one's personality.78 Other such rights include the 
right to be free from the arbitrary interference with one's privacy, 
family, home, or correspondence and from attacks upon one's honor 
and reputation.79 Then, there are some so-called rights that are proba-
bly best placed on a wish list, such as the right to rest and leisure80 and 
the rightto a standard ofliving adequate for the health and well being 
of oneself and one's family, including food, clothing, housing, and 
medical care and necessary social services.8l 
3. Influential Contemporary Rights Theorists 
Numerous rights-based theories have been advanced as a result of 
the colossal, and apparently ever increasing, amount of ethical lan-
guage that is expressed in the form of rights. Rights talk transcends all 
73. H. L. A. HART, ESSAYS IN]URISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 196-97 (1983). 
74. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A 
(XXI), Dec. 16, 1966,999 D.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
75. UDHR, supra note 16, at art. 3; ICCPR, supra note 17, at art. 6. 
76. UDHR, supra note 16, at art. 3; ICCPR, supra note 17, at art. 9. 
77. UDHR, supra note 16, at art. 5; ICCPR, supra note 17, at art. 7. 
78. UDHR, supra note 16, at art. 22; ICESCR, supra note 74, at arts. 9 & 15. 
79. UDHR, supra note 16, at art. 12; ICCPR, supra note 17, at art. 17. 
80. UDHR, supra note 16, at art. 24; ICESCR, supra note 77, at art. 7(d). 
81. UDHR, supra note 16, at art. 25; ICESCR, sqpra note 76, at art. 11. The list does 
not end there. 
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areas of moral discourse. Rights are now the conventional moral cur-
rency. The main differences between them are typically the precise 
rights that are acclaimed, the basis of the rights, and the absolutism 
with which they apply. The main role of rights in deontological theo-
ries is to protect people from being compelled to do something 
against their wishes for the good of another or the general good. Two 
of the most influential contemporary rights theories are examined in 
the following sections-those of Ronald Dworkin and Robert Nozick. 
Many of the observations made in relation to these theories are appli-
-cable to most other rights-based theories. 
a. Dworkin: Concern and Respect 
For Dworkin, rights are "political trumps: held by individuals,"82 
which protect them from the pursuit of common goods. Dworkin 
states that" [t] he prospect of utilitarian gains cannot justify preventing 
a man from doing what he has a right to dO,"83 and that the general 
good is never an adequate basis for limiting rights.84 He asserts that 
people have rights when there are good reasons for conferring upon 
them benefits or opportunities despite a community interest to the 
contrary.B5 
According to Dworkin, in order to take rights seriously, one 
must accept ... one or both of two important ideas. The first is the 
vague but powerful idea of human dignity. This idea, associated 
with Kant ... supposes that there are ways of treating a man that 
are inconsistent with recognizing him as a full member of the 
human community, and holds that such treatment is profoundly 
unjust. 
The second is the more familiar idea of political equality.86 
Observance of these ideals leads to the fundamental right of 
equal concern and respect, which is the foundation of Dworkin's 
rights thesis.B7 Under this theory, it makes sense to say that a person 
has a right if that right is necessary to protect tiJ.e person's dignity or 
his standing as being equally entitled to concern and respect. Tp treat 
one with concern is to treat one as a human being, capable of suffer-
82. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (Gerald Duckworth & Co., 4th ed. 
1978). 
83. Id. at 193. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 194. 
86. Id. at 198. 
87. Id. at 199; see also Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBUC AND PRIVATE MORALI'IY 
113, 127, 136 (Stuart Hampshire, ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1979). 
600 UNIVERSIlY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
ing and frustration,88 and to accord respect is to recognize~one as a 
human being capable of forming and acting on intelligent concep-
tions of how life should be lived.89 
h. Nozick: Rights That Exist in a State of Nature 
Robert Nozick's rights theory stems from his analysis of the legiti-
mate role of the state.90 For the purpose of this Article, the end prod-
uct. of this state is less important than his picture of morality that 
underpins it. Nozick believes that morality is founded on rights. For 
him, the rights we have are those that supposedly exist in a .state of 
nature and derive from our naturalliberty.91 This gives rise to sev~ral 
distinct rights: the right to absolute control over ourselves, the right to 
be free from!all forms of physical violations, and the right to acquire 
property and other resources as a result of the proper exercise of 9ur 
personal rights. These rights are contingent upon not violating the 
same rights of others. Individuals also have the right to exact retribu-
tion against, and compensation from, those who violate th~ir rights. 
Under this theory, moral rights are said to act as side constraints on 
the actions of others and cannot be violated even to achieve greater 
goods.92 Thus, on Nozick's account, moral rights are negative rights-
88. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 82, at 272. 
89. [d. 
90. Nozick begins by imagining that no state exists. He then details the -type of state 
that is legitimat~ and the type of state that he believes people would mold consistent with 
their moral rights. Through this process he claims that we would arrive at the minimal 
state, a position between anarchy and a redistributive state. In this state, fetters on freedom 
are few. Individuals have power to own and transfer property and to hire the labor of 
others. The state has an extremely minimalist role, its functions being confined to those 
that are essentially protective in nature. Basically, the state can only protect against such 
matters as force, theft, enforcement of contracts, and so on. It cannot implement paternal-
ist measures or coerce citizens to aid· others. Thus, the state cannot assume private prop-
erty or impose taxes in order to, say, redistribute resources to the disadvantaged. Roles 
such as this, if they are to be undertaken, must be left to private individuals and enter-
prises. This is the type of state, a pure form of capitalism, that it is claimed will emerge 
through an "invisible hand process" by rational people acting in a self-interested manner. 
Nozick claims that this type of minimal state is the best manner to ensure that rights are 
not violated. A more powerful state would impinge upon individual rights and is, hence, 
unjustifiable unless people unanimously waive some of their rights to establish such a state. 
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY STATE AND UTOPIA 206-07 (Basic Books 1974) [hereinafter 
NOZICK, ANARCHY]. 
91. [d. 
92. Nozick believes that the paramountcy accorded to,the right of self-ownership and 
liberty is necessary to protect people from the burdensome demands of competing moral 
theories such as utilitarianism. For example, he believes o~ly his rights theory can protect 
people from such ghastly violations as forced organ donations where the donations would 
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there are no positive rights such as the right t~ welfare or health 
car-e.93 
On the basis of either theory, torture is on its face offensive. For 
Dworkin torture does not accord an agent the concern and respect 
that is owed to each individual. On the basis of Nozick's account, tor-
ture is indefensible because it directly violates the right to be free 
from physical violations. 
4. Explanation for the Influence of Rights Theory 
There are several responses to rights-based .theorists. First, the 
fact that a belief or judgment is capable of moving and guiding 
human conduct says little about its truth-the widespread practice of 
burning "witches" being a case in point. Second, at the descriptive 
level, it is probably the case that· the intuitive appeal of rights claims 
and the absolutist and forceful manner in which they are expressed 
has been normally sufficient to mask over fundamental logical defi-
ciencies associated with the concept of rights. Cla,ims couched in the 
language of rights seem to carry more emotive punch than equivalent 
claims grounded in the language of duties. For whatever reason (per-
haps due to the egocentric nature of rights discourse) the claim that 
"I have a right to life" appears to resonate more powerfully than the 
maximize happiness by saving the lives of many or assisting those most in need. NOZICK, 
ANARCHY, supra, note 90, at 206-07. -
~3. Nozick goes on to develop a retributive theory of punishment from his general 
moral theory. Nozick advances a communicative theory of punishment in which he claims 
that punishment is justified on the basis .that it reconnects the offender with the correct 
values from which his wrongdoing has disconnected him. Punishment conveys a message 
from. those with appropriate values to offenders, whose own conduct shows that they pos-
sess:incorrect values, that their conduct was wrong. The message aims to affect the criminal 
in a way that corresponds with the magnitude of the offense. ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHI-
CAL EXPLANATIONS 363-97 (1981). Thus Nozick's theory has many similarities wlth Duff's 
theory of punishment, though a significant difference between the theories is that Nozick's 
theory is even more purely non-consequential, since in order fo!, punishment to be justi-
fied on Nozick's account there is no need that this message shou~d achieve IJ;loral transfor-
mation of the offender; punishment is "right or good in itself, apart from the further 
consequences to which it might lead." Id. at 374. There are several specific problems with 
Nozick's theory of punishment. It has been noted that if it is irrelevant whether or not 
punishment changes the offender or not, then we are still left wondering why the message 
must be conveyed in the first place. See NIGEL WALKER, WHY PUNISH? 81 (1991). Nozick 
provides a hint when he states that through punishment the correct values have some 
significant effect on the offender's life and make the offender less pleased with his actions. 
In this way he argues the offender is encourage.d to regret the values that he once held. As 
Ten points out, however, this is, in effect, no more than a subtle way of stating that the aim 
of punishment is to encourage regret and to achieve deterrence, which are clearly conse-
quentialist considerations from which Nozick is disqualified from resorting. See TEN, supra 
note 9, at 42-46. 
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assertion that "you have a duty not to kill me." In effect, the much 
criticized meta-ethical theory of emotivism,94 which provides that mo-
rality is a set of utterances that express one's attitude with the aim of 
influencing the behavior of others, seems to provide at least a partial 
explanation for the influence of rights-based discourse. 
The real analysis, however, must move outside of the abstract and 
determine how these theories would respond to the use of torture in a 
real-life scenario. 
5. Practical Application of Rights Theories and the Terrorist-Plane 
Scenario 
Despite the dazzling veneer of deontological rights-based theories 
and their influence on present day moral and legal discourse, when 
examined closely, such theories are unable to provide persuasive an-
swers to central issues such as: What is the justification for rights? How 
can we distinguish real from fanciful rights? Which right takes priority 
in the event of conflicting rights?95 Such intractable difficulties stem 
from the fact that contemporary rights theories lack a coherent foun-
dation for rights. Tom Campbell has argued against certain rights-
based theories on the basis that they are unable to provide a satisfac-
tory account of the relationship between concrete rights (rights that 
provide ajustification for political decisions by society in general) and 
more fundamental rights ("background rights") from which concrete 
rights are supposedly derived.96 An even more fundamental flaw with 
rights theories, however, is that there is no defensible virtue that un-
derpins the background interests from which narrower rights claims 
can be derived. 
When examined closely, the concept of non-consequentialist 
rights is vacuous at the epistemological level. It has been argued that 
attempts to ground concrete rights in virtues such as dignity, integrity, 
concern, and respect are unsound because resort to such ideals is ar-
bitrary and leads to discrimination against certain members of the 
community (for example, those with severely limited cognitive func-
94. See, e.g., G. J. WARNOCK, CONTEMPORARY MORAL PHILOSOPHY 24-26 (1967). 
. 95. Mirko Bagaric, In Defence of a Utilitarian TherYry of Punishment: Punishing the Innocent 
and the Compatibility of Utilitarianism and Rights, 24 AUSTL.J. LEGAL PHIL. 95,121-43 (1999); 
MrRKO BAGARIC, SENTENCING AND PUNISHMENT: A RATIONAL APPROACH ch. 4 (2000). 
96. See Tom Campbell, Justice 52 (lst ed. 1990). 
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tioning') or speciesism(the systematic discrimination against non-
humans).97 
Ultimately, a non-consequentialist ethic provides no method for 
distinguishing between genuine and fanciful rights claims and is inca-
. pable of providing guidance regarding the ranking of rights in the 
event of a clash. It is not surprising then that nowadays all sorts of 
dubious rights claims have been advanced. Thus, we have a situation 
where individuals are able to hold a straight face and urge interests 
such as "the right to a tobacco-free job," the "right to sunshine," the 
"right of a father to be present in the delivery room," the "right to a 
sex break,"98 and even the "right to drink myself to death without 
interference. "99 
A further flaw with many rights theories, including thos~ of Dwor-
kin and NoziCk, is that an absolute right does not exist. Not_even the 
right to life is sacrosanct. This is evident from the fact that all cultures 
sanction the use of lethal force in self-defense. And, indeed, torture-
in the circumstances that we indicate is morally permissible-is in fact 
a manifestation of the right to self-defense, which extends to the right 
to defend another. By conceding that in some situations conse-
quences must prevail, Dworkin's and Nozick's respective theories be-
come unstable. 
Despite the absolute overtones of their theories and their insis-
tence of the importance of the individual, Dworkin and Nozick would 
probably, yet reluctantly, respond to the terrorist-plane scenario by 
approving of torture in certain circumstances; 
Dworkin accepts that it is correct for a government to infringe on 
a right when it is necessary to protect a more important right or to 
ward off "some grave threat to society."lOO In a like manner, Nozick 
states that teleological considerations would take over to "avert moral 
catastrophe."lOl Although both fail to state, even loosely, at what point 
a great threat to society or a moral catastrophe exists, so that conse-
quentialist considerations can legitimately "kick in" to guide !=onduct, 
it is tenable to argue that the loss of 300 innocent lives satisfies this 
97. See, e.g., Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, in APPLIED ETHICS 64-71 (P. 
Singer ed., 1986); Peter Singer, All Animals Are Equal, in APPLIED ETHICS 215, 215-16 (P. 
Singer ed., 1986). 
98. These examples are cited by John Kleinig, Human Rights, Legal Rights and Social 
Change, inHUMAN RiGHTS 36, 40 (Eugene Kamenka & Alice Erh-Soon Tay eds., 1978). 
99. Stanley I. Benn, Rights, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY vol. 7, at 196 (Paul 
Edwards ed., 1967). 
100. DWORKIN, TAKING RiGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 82, at 201. 
101. NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 90, at 95. 
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criteria. When consequential considerations are admitted as being rel-
evant, the theories become hybrid_and the main theoretical advantage 
of a deontological theory, the absolute protection given to people 
against certain intrusions, is forsaken. This problem is heightened be-
cause, in both cases, we are given no guidance as to when consequen-
tialist considerations become overriding. At this point rights theories 
collapse-they can neither fully rely on the theoretical justifications of 
deontological or consequentialist theories. 
Nearly twenty years ago, Hart said of rights theories, "It cannot be 
said that we have had . . . a sufficiently detailed or adequately articu-
late theory showing the foundation for such rights and how they are 
related to other values . . . . Indeed the revived doctrines of basic 
rights ... are in spite of much brilliance still unconvincing."102 Noth-
ing has changed to diminish the (orce of this objection. 
This may seem to be unduly;dismissive of rights-based theories 
and to pay inadequate regard to the considerable moral reforms that 
have occurred against the backdrop of rights talk over the past half-
century. It cannot be denied that rights claims have been an effective 
lever for social change. As Campbell correctly notes, rights have pro-
vided "a constant source of inspiration for the protection of individual 
liberty rights."103 For example, recognition of the right to liberty re-
sulted in the abolition of slavery and, more recently, the right of 
equality has been used as an effective weapon by women and other 
disempoWered groups seeking gre-ater employment and civil rights, 
such as the right to vote. . 
There is no doubt that there is an ongoing need for moral dis-
course in the form of rights; "[w]hether or not ... rights are intellec-
tually defensible or culturally tolerant, we do have need of them, at 
least at the edges of civilization and in the tangle of international 
politics."lo4 Rather, as is discussed below, the only manner in which 
rights can be substantiated is in the context of a consequentialist 
ethic. The criticism is with deontological rights-based moral theories 
and their absolutist overtones. Theories of this nature are incapable of 
providing answers to questions such as the existence and content of 
proposed rights. This view could obviously be criticized on the basis 
that if non-consequentialist rights are fanciful, then one has difficulty 
accounting for the significant changes to the moral landscape for 
which they have provided the catalyst. 
102. HART, sufrra note 73, at 195. 
103. CAMPBELL, supra note 68, at 165. 
104. [d. . 
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B~ Torture and Utilitarianism 
There have been a range of consequentialist moral theories ad-
vanced, such as egoism and utilitarianism. The most cogent of these 
theories, and certainly the most influential in moral and political dis-
COl.Use, is hedonistic act utilitarianism. This theory provides that the 
morally right acti9n is that which produces the greatest amount of 
happiness or pleasure and the least amount of pain or 
unhappiness. I 05 
Utilitarianisni has received a lot of bad press over the pasf few 
decades,106 resulting in its demise as the leading normative theory. 
There are several reasons for this. The main general argument against 
utilitarianism is that because it prioritizes net happiness over ind~vid­
ual pursuits, it fails to safeguard fundamental individual interests. As a 
result of this, it has been argued that in some circumstances utilitari-
anism leads to horrendous outcomes, such as punishing the inno-
centl07 or forcing organ donations where the donations would 
maximize happiness by saving the lives of many or assisting those most 
in need. lOS These outcomes are essentially inflicting harsh pain of one 
person for the benefit of others. Another major criticism of utilitarian-
ism is that it supposedly does not accord sufficient weight to individ-
ual interests. As noted above, it has been charged that only rights-
based theories take seriously the distinction between human beings. 
This is in contrast to utilitarianism where the uitimate goal-happi-
ness-is aggregative is nature. The happiness of any particular individ-
ual is trumped by the goal of net human happiness. 
Against a background of utilitarian ethic, torture is clearly ju~tifia­
ble where the harm caused to the agent will be offset by the increased 
happiness gained to other people. 109 Utilitarianism has been persua-
. sively criticIzed in the eyes of many, precisely because it justifies· sup-
105. SeeJ. J. c. SMART, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in UTIUTARlANISM: FOR 
AND AGAINST 1 (J.J. C. Smart & B. Williams eds., 1973). 
106. See, ·e.g., B. WILLIAMS, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND 
AGAINST 12-16 G.J. C. Smart and B. Williams eds., 1973). 
107. See HJ. MCCLOSKEY, META-ETHICS AND NORMATIVE ETHICS 180-82 (1969). A similar 
example to McCloskey's is provided in E.F. CARruTT, ETHICAL AND POLITICAL THINKING 65 
(1947). -
108. See NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 90, 206-07. 
109. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, Value of a Lot of Pleasure or Pain, How To Be Measured, in 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MoRALS AND LEGISLATION (Clarendon Press 1907) 
(1789). This work has been cited by Dershowitz as providing "the most powerful utilitarian 
case for limited torture of convicted criminals to gather information necessary to prevent 
serious future crime.» Alan M. Dershowitz, The Torture Warrant: A Response to Professor 
Strauss, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 275, 275-76 (2004). 
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posedly egregious conducJ of this nature. Thus, it can be argued tha 
the fact that utilitarianism justifies torture indicates that the theory h 
flawed. Historically, the same sort of argument has been used mosl 
forcefully in the context that utilitarianism may justify punishing the 
innocent. The issue of torturing the innocent is directly discussed in 
Part IV. 
The most telling theoretical objection against utilitarianism is 
that it permits punishment of the innocent. A famous illustration of 
the objection concerning punishing the innocent is McCloskey's small 
town sheriff example: 
Suppose a sheriff were faced with the choice of either framing a 
negro for a rape which had aroused white hostility to negroes (this 
particular negro being believed to be guilty) and thus preventing 
serious anti-negro riots which would probably lead to loss oflife, or 
of allowing the riots to occur. If he were ... [a] utilitarian he 
would be committed to framing the negro.1 10 
1. Hard Cases Lead to Hard Decisions 
A common utilitarian response to this dilemma is that such exam-
ples are impossible in the real world and hence need not be ad-
dressed.lll Punishing the innocen~ may at times provide short term 
benefits, such as securing social stability. Nevertheless, these benefits 
are always more than offset by the likelihood of greater long term 
harm due to the . loss of confidence in the legal system and the associ-
ated loss of security to all m~mbers of the community who will fear 
that they may be the next person framed, once the inevitable occurs 
and it is disclosed that an innocent person has been punished. But 
with only a little imagination, the above example can be tightened up 
by introducing considerations that significantly reduce or totally obvi-
ate the possibility of disclosure, so that the only logical utilitarian con-
clusion is to punish the innocent.H2 Even if the process of modifying 
110. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 107, at iSO-8l. A similar example to McCloskey's is pro-
vided in EDGAR F. CAruurr, ETHICAL AND POLITICAL THINKING 65 (1950). 
Ill. See, e.g., T.L.S. Sprigge, A Utilitarian Reply to Dr. McCloskey, 8 INQUIRY 264, 272 
(1965). 
112. As an example, McCloskey's hypothetical could be altered by providing that the 
town was an isolated one, hence there is no opportunity for help arriving before the riots 
occurred. Also the crime should be a murder, not a rape, in which case there is one less 
pt;rson who could reveal the miscarriage of justice that has occurred, and thus the risk of a 
possible loss of respect and confidence in the law is not as significant See also TEN, supra 
note 9, at 18. Brandt & Rawls have argued that the utilitarian rule is not necessarily com-
mitted to punishing the innocent. RICHARD B. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY: THE PROBLEMS OF 
NORMATIVE AND CRITICAL ETHICS 490-95 (1959);]. Rawls, Two Ccmcepts of Rules 64 PHIL. 
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the examples appears to far remove them from the real world, it is still 
a situation that the utilitarian must deal with. 
The more promising utilitarian response is not to attempt to de-
flect or avoid the conclusion that there may be some extreme situa-
tions where utilitarianism commits us to punishing the innocent or 
torturing individuals, but rather the correct approach is to accept this 
outcome and contend that, as horrible as this may seem on a pre-
reflective level, on closer consideration it is not a matter that really 
insurmountably troubles our sensibilities to the extent that it entails 
that any theory that approves of such an outcome must necessarily be 
flawed. By drawing comparisons with other situations in which we take 
the utilitarian option, it is contended that practices such as punishing 
the innocent and torture are not_necessarily unacceptable. 
The view that punishing the innocent and torturing individuals is 
the morally correct action in some circumstances is consistent with 
and accords with the decisions we as individuals and societies as a 
whole readily have made and continue to make when faced with ex-
treme and desperate circumstanc~s. Once we come to grips with the 
fact that our decisions in extreme situations will be compartmental-
ized to desperate predicaments, we do, and should, though perhaps 
somewhat begrudgingly, take the utilitarian option. In the face of ex-
treme situations, we are quite ready to accept that one should, or even 
must, sacrifice oneself or others for the good of the whole. 
For example, in times of war we not only request our strongest 
and healthiest to fight to the death for the good of the community, 
but we often demand that they do so under threat of imprisonment or 
even death. Quite often they must battle against hopeless odds, in cir-
cumstances where we are aware that in all probability they are not 
coming back.ns What is more: they must give their life. Not because 
they want to, not because they are bad, but merely because it would be 
good for the rest of us. This is classical utilitarian reasoning. Faced 
with the reality of the decisions we do make in such horrible situations, 
the examples proffered against utilitarianism about the terrible things 
it entails, such as punishing the innocent, lose their bite. 
REv. 3 (1955). But see HJ. McCloskey, A Non-Utilitarian Approach to Punishment, 8 INQUIRY 
249 (1965); TEN, supra note 9, at 67-71. 
113. While this is not nonnally the case, i.e., we nonnally like to think that we send our 
soldiers into situations with at least a fighting chance, there are countless reported in-
stances of men being ordered to go or remain in situations that can only be described as 
suicide missions. For those brave men who voluntarily place themselves in such situations, 
it is rather illuminating that the proscription against suicide disappears. They are heroes 
rather than bad men-they followed the dictates of utilitarianism. 
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Horrible situations make for appalling decisions whichever way 
we turn, but ultimately we do make the utilitarian choice because of 
our lack of true commitment to any higher moral virtue. By opting for 
the utilitarian line we are soothed by one saving grace: at least the 
level of harm has been minimized. When the good of many or the 
whole is at significant threat, we have no difficulty selecting certain 
classes of innocent individuals, whose only "flaw" is their sex, state of 
health, and date of birth to go in to bat for the rest of us. Their pro-
tests that they should not be compelled to go because it impinges on 
their civil, legal, or human rights to such matters as life and liberty, or 
their desperate appeals to other virtues such as justice or integrity, fall 
on obstinate ears; for this is serious stuff now-our lives (or other im-
portant interests) are at stake. Such appeals should be saved for rosier 
times. When advanced in theory, we can all "agree" that this is so. 
The decisions we do actually make in a real life crisis are the best 
evidence of the way we actuaIly do prioritize important, competing 
principles and interests. Matters such as rights and justice are impor-
tant, but, ih the end, are subservient to and make way for the ultimate 
matter of significance: general happiness. Bad as it seems, framing the 
Mrican-American, imprisoning the innocent, and torturing the terror-
ist are certainly no more horrendous than the decisions history has 
shown we have made in circumstances of monumental crisis. 
A pointed example is the~ecision by then English Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill to saciifice the lives of the residents of Coventry in 
order not to alert the German~ that the English had deciphered Ger-
man radio messages. On 14 November 1940 the English decoded 
plans that the Germans were about to air bomb Coventry.114 If Coven-
try was evacuated or its inhabitants advised to take special precautions 
against the raid,.the Germans would know that their code had been 
. .. 
cracked, and the English wou,ld be unable to. obtain future informa-
tion about the intentions of its enemy,ll5 Churchill elected not to 
Warn the citizens of Coventry, and many hundreds were killed in the 
raid that followed. Many innocent lives were sacrificed in order not to 
reveal the secret that would hopefully save many more lives in the 
future.l 16 Significantly, such decisions have subsequently been im-
114. MANUEL VELASQUEZ & CYNrHIA ROSTANKowSKI, ETHICS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
103-06 (Prentice-Hall 1985). 
115. See id. 
116. See id. A famous modem day example that comes ·closest to the dilemma of choos-
ing whether to frame the innocent or tolerate massive abuses of rights followed the Rodney 
King beating in Los Angeles on 3 March 1991. The policemen who beat King were acquit-
ted under state law of any offense regarding the incident. Riots ensued resulting in wide-
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mune from widespread or persuasive criticism. This shows not only 
that when pressed we do take the utilitarian option, but also that it is 
felt that this is the option we should take. 
Now, what we actually do does not justify what ought to be done. 
Morality is normative, not descriptive in nature: an "ought" cannot be 
derived from.an ''is.''1l7 Still, the above account is telling because the 
force of the "punishing the innocent" objection lies in the fact that it 
supposedly so troubles our moral consciousness that utilitarianism can 
thereby be dismissed because the outcome is so horrible that "there 
must be a mistake somewhere." But this claim loses its force when it is 
shown that punishing the innocent and torturing the culpable is, in 
fact, no worse than other activities that we condone. 
2. The Role of Rights in Utilitarian Ethic 
The criticism that utilitarianism has no place for rights must be 
responded to for the sake of completeness (and in an attempt to fur-
ther redeem l,ltilitarianism). Rights do in fact have a place in a utilita-
rian ethic, and, what is more, it is only against this background that 
rights can be explained and their sourcejustified. Utilitarianism pro-
vides a sounder foundation for rights than any other competing the-
ory. Indeed, for the utilitarian, the answer to why rights exist is simple: 
recognition of them best promotes general utility. us Their origin ac-
cordingly lies in the pursuit of happiness. Their content is di~covered 
through empirical observations regarding the patterns of behavior 
that best advance the utilitarian cause. The long association of utilita-
spread looting, damage to property, and dozens of deaths. Shortly afterwards the 
government announced the almost unprecedented step that the policemen, who were 
found innocent of the alleged crime, were to be tried on federal charges regarding the 
incident. They were duly found guilty, despite the apparent double jeopardy involved. See 
DAVID COLE, No· EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYsTEM 23 
(1999), for a.discussion of this incident. Whatever one's view of the government's motiva-
non for charging the policemen, it seems that justice took a back seat, at least for a while. 
117. This has been used as an 'argurrient against a naturalistic view of morality. See, 
however, C.R. Pigden, Naturalism, in A COMPANION TO ETHICS 421, 422-26 (P. Singer ed., 
1991), where he points out that this phenomenon simply reflects the conservative nature 
of logic-you cannot get out of it what you do not put in. . 
118. According to Mill, rights reconcile justice with utility. justice, which he claims con-
sists of certain fundamental rights, is merely a part of utility. "[T]o have a right is ... to 
have something which society ought to defend .... [If asked why,]. :. I can give no other 
reason than general utility." J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM 251, 309 (Mary War-
nock ed., Fontana Press, Glasgow, 1986). Campbell also proposes a reductive approach to 
rights, however, underlying his rights thesis is not utilitarianism, but rather (ethical) posi-
tivist ideals. CAMPBELL, supra note 68, at 161-85; see also Tom Campbell, The Point of Legal 
Positivism, in LEGAL POSITIVISM 323 (Tom Campbelled., ·199~). 
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rianism and rights appears· to hav<been forgotten by most. Over a 
century ago it was Mill, however, who proclaimed the right of free 
speech, contending that truth is important to the attainment of gen-
eral happiness and this is best discovered by its· competition with 
falsehood. 119 
Difficulties in performing the utilitarian calculus regarding each 
decision make it desirable that we ascribe certain rights and interests 
to people that evidence shows tend to maximize happiness12o-even 
more happiness than if we made all of our decisions without such 
guidelines. Rights save time and energy by serving as shortcuts to assist 
us in attaining desirable consequences. By labeling certain interests as 
rights, we are spared the tedious task of establishing the importance 
of a particular interest as a first premise in practical arguments.121 
There are also other reasons why performing the utilitarian calculus 
on each occasion may be counterproductive to the ultimate aim. Our 
capacity to gather and process information and our foresight are re-
stricted by a large number of factors, including lack of time, indiffer-
ence to the matter at hand, defects in reasoning, and so on. We are 
quite often not in a good position to assess all the possible alternatives 
and to determine the likely impact upon general happiness stemming 
from each alternative. Our ability to make the correct decision will be 
greatly assisted if we can narrow down the range of relevant factors in 
light of pre-determined guidelines. History has shown that certain pat-
terns of conduct and norms of behavior if observed are most condu-
cive to promoting happiness. These observations are given expression 
in the form of rights that can be asserted in the absence of evidence as 
to why adherence to them in the particular case would not maximize 
net happiness. 
Thus, importance of rights in a utilitarianism view do not have a 
life of their own (they are derivative not foundational), as is the case 
with de ontological theories. Due to the derivative character of utilita-
rian rights, they do not carry the same degree of absolutism or "must 
be doneness" as those based on deontological theories. This is not a 
criticism of utilitarianism, however; indeed, this characteristic is a 
119. Mill, supra note 118, at 141-83. 
120. These rights, however, are never decisive and must be disregarded where they 
would not cause net happiness (otherwise this would be to go down the utilitarianism rule 
track). 
121. See JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALI"IY'OF FREEDOM 191 (Oxford Univ. Press 1986). Raz 
also provides that such rights are useful because they enable us to settle on shared interme-
diary conclusions, despite considerable dispute regarding the grounds for the conclusions. 
Id. 
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strength because it is farcical to claim that any right is absolute. An-
other advantage of utilitarianism is that only it provides a mechanism 
for ranking rights and other interests. In the event of a clash, the 
victor is the right that will generate the most happiness. As the next 
part discusses, the balancing aspect of utilitarianism is the reason that 
it is particularly apposite to determining the circumstances in which 
torture is appropriate. 
m. The CircumstanCes in Which Torture Is Acceptable 
The only situation W:here torture is justifiable is where it is used as 
an information gathering technique to avert a grave risk. In such cir-
cumstances, there are five variables relevant in determining whether 
torture is permissible and the degree of torture that is appropriate. 
The variables are (1) the number of lives at risk; (2) the immediacy of 
the harm; (3) the availability of other means to acquire the informa-
tion; (4) the level of wrongdoing of the agent; and (5) the likelihood 
that the agent actually does possess the relevant information. Where 
(1), (2), (4) and (5) rate highly and (3) is low, all forms of harm may 
be inflicted on the agent-even if this results in death. 
A. The Harm to Be Prevented 
The key consideration regarding the. permissibility of torture is 
the magnitude of harm that is sought to be prevented. To this end, 
the appropriate measure.is the number of lives that are likely to be 
lost if the threatened hann is not alleviated. Obviously, the more lives 
that are at stake, the more weight that is attributed to this variable. 
Lesser forms of threatened harm will not justify torture. Logically, 
the right to life is the most basic and fundamental of all human 
rights-non-observance of it would render all other human rights de-
void of meaning.122 Every society has some prohibition against taking 
life,123 and "the intentional taking of human life is ... the offence 
which society condemns most strongly."124 The right to life is also en-
shrined in several international covenants. For example, Article 2 of 
the Europe;~n Convention on Human Rights (which in essence mir-
122. See also MANFRED NowAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: 
C.C.P.R COMMENTARY 104 (N.P. Engel ed., 1993); Sarah Joseph, The Right to Life, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND UNITED KINGDOM LAw 155 
(David Harris & Sarah Joseph eds., 1995). 
123. See PETER SINGER. PRACHCAL ETHICS 85 (2d ed. 1993). : 
124. THE HOUSE OF LoRDS, REpORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON MEDICAL ETHICS, vol. 
1, at 13 (1994). 
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rors Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Riglits) provides that "everyone's right to life shall be protected by 
law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the exe-
cution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for 
which this penalty is provided by laW."125 
Torture violates the right to physical integrity, which is so impor-
tant that it is only a th~eat to the right to life that can justify interfer-
ence with it. Thus, torture should be confined to situations where the 
righ t to life is imperiled. 
B. Immediacy of Harm and Other Options to Obtain Information 
Torture should only be used as a last resort and hence should not 
be utilized where there is time to pursue other avenues of fbrestalling 
the harm. It js for this reason that torture should only be Used where 
there is no other means to obtain the relevant information. Thus, 
where a terrorist has planted a bomb on a plane, torture will not be 
permis~ible where, for example, video tapes of international airports 
are likely to reveal the identity of the plane that has been targeted . 
. C. The· Likelihood of Knowledge or· Guilt 
As a general rule torture should normally be confined to people 
that are responsible in some way for the threatened harm. This is not, 
however, invariably the case .. People who are simply aware of the 
threatened harm, that is "innocent people," may. in some _circum-
stances also be subjected to torture. 
Regardless of the guilt of the agent, it is most important that tor-
tureis only used against individuals who actually possess the relevant 
information. It -will be rare that conclusive proof is available that an 
individual does, in fact, possess the required knowledge; for example, 
potential ~orturees will not have been through a trial process in which 
their guilt has been established. This is not a decisive objection, how-
ever, to the use of torture. The investigation and trial process is simply 
one means of distinguishing wrongdoers from the innocent. To that 
end, it does not seem to ~e a particularly effective process. There are 
other ways of forming such conclusions. One is by way of lie-detector 
tests. The latest information suggests that polygraphs are accurate 
125. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, supra note 18, at art. 2. 
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about eighty to ninety per cent of the time. 126 There has been little 
empirical research done to ascertain the number of innocent people 
who are ultimately convicted of criminal offenses. As one example, 
however, research carried out in the United Kingdom for the Royal 
Commission on Criminal Justice suggests that up to eleven percent of 
people who plead guilty claim innocence.l27 The wrongful acquittal 
rate would no doubt be even higher than this. 
Moreover, it is important to note that even without resort to 
polygraphs there will be many circumstances where guilt or relevant 
kp.owledge is patently obvious. A clear example is where a person 
makes a relevant admission that discloses information that would only 
b~ within the knowledge of the Wrongdoer. Another example oc-
chrred in the recent German kidnapping case, referred to earlier, 
w;here the man in custody had been witnessed collecting a ransom and 
had indicated to the police that the kidnapped boy was still alive.l28 
Where lesser forms of evidence proving guilt are available, the argu-
ment in favor of torture is lower. 
D. The Formula 
Incorporating all these considerations, the strength of the case in 
favor of torture can be mapped as follows: 
W+L+P 
ThO 
Where: 
W = whether the agent is the wrongdoer 
L = the number of lives that will be lost if the information is not 
provided 
p = the probability that the agent has the relevant kno~ledge 
T= the time available before the disaster will occur ("immediacy of 
the harm") 
o = the likelihood that other inquiries will forestall the risk 
Wis a weighting that is attributable to whether the agent has had any 
direct connection with the potential catastrophe. Where the person is 
126. Dan Vergano, Telling the Truth About Lie Detectvrs, USA TODAY, Sept. 9, 2002, availa-
ble at http://www.usatoday.com/new$/nation/2002-09-09-lie_x.htm (last accessed Apr. 4, 
2005). 
127. ROYAL COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REpORT, UNITED KINGDOM (1993); see also 
ROGER HOOD, RACE AND SENTENCING 125 (19~2); P. Darbyshire, The Mischiefof Plea Bargain-
ing and Sentencing Rewards, CRIM. L. REv. (London), 2000, at 903; M. Zander, 'What on Earth 
Is Lvrdjustice Auld Supposed to Do?, CruM. L. REv. (London), 2000, at 419. 
128. Police Threat Fuels Debate on Torture, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Germany), Feb. 24, 2003, 
available at http://www.dw-world.de/english/0.3367.1430_A_785751.00.html (last accessed 
Apr. 18, 2005). 
614 UNIVERSI1Y OF SAN FRANCISCO lAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
responsible for the incident-for example, planted or organized the 
bomb-more emphasis should be attached. Where the agent is inno-
cent and has simply stumbled on the relevant information-for exam-
ple, she saw the bomb being planted or overheard the plan to plant 
the bomb-this should be reduced by a certain amount. The prohibi-
tion against inflicting harm on the innocent is certainly strong, but it 
is not inviolable.129 
Torture should be .permitted where the application of the vari-
ables exceeds a threshold level. Once beyond this level, the higher the 
figure the more severe· the forms of torture that are permissible. 
There is no bright line that can be drawn concerning the point at 
which the "torture thres~old" should be set. More precision can, how-
ever, be obtained by first ascribing unit ranges to each of the above 
variables (depending on their relative importance), then applying the 
formula to a range of hypOthetical situations, and then making a judg-
ment about the numerical point at which torture is acceptable. 
There is obviously a degree of imprecision attached to this pro-
cess and considerable scope for discussion and disagreement regard-
ing the exact weight that should be attached to each variable. It is. 
important to emphasize, however, that this is not an argument against 
our proposal. Rather it is .a signal for further discussion and refine-
ment. This is a call that we are confident other commentators will take 
up. The purpose of this Ar.!icle is not to set in stone the full range of 
circumstances where torture is justifiable. Our aim is more modest-
to convince readers that torture is justifiable in some circumstances 
and to set out the variables that are relevant to such an inquiry. 
IV. Regulation Better Than Prohibition 
In addition to the moral argument for torture as an interrogation 
device, Dershowitz has argued that torture should be legalized for 
harm minimization reasons. Dershowitz has pushed for the introduc-
tion of "a torture warrant," which would place a "heavy burden on the 
government to demonstrate .by factual evidence the necessity to ad-
minister this horrible, horrible technique of torture."130 He further 
adds: 
129. See discussion supra Part L 
130. Dershowitz Interview, supra note 2. Dershowitz carne across the idea for "torture 
warrants" while reading about sixteenth and seventeenth century England and France. 
While the French were torturing "virtually everybody," the English Privy Council instituted 
warrants. This led to about 100 people being tortured over the course of a century. See 
Silver, supra note 6. 
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I think that we're much, much better off admitting what we're do-
ing or not doing it at all. I agree with you, it will much better if we 
never did it. But if we're going to do it and subcontract and find 
ways of circumventing, it's much better to do what Israel did. They 
were the only country in the world ever directly to confront the 
issue, and it led to a supreme court decision, as you say, outlawing 
torture, and yet Israel has been criticized all over the world for 
confronting the issue directly. Candor and accountability in a de-
mocracy is very important. Hypocrisy has no place.131 
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Th~ obvious counter to this is the slippery slop~ argument. "If 
you start opening the door, making a little exception here, a little 
exception there, you've basically sent the signal that the ends justify 
the means," resulting in even more torture,132 The sl~ppery slope ar-
gument is often invoked in relation to acts that in themselves are justi-
fied, but which have similarities with objectionable-practices, and 
urges that in morally appraising an action we must not only consider 
its intrinsic features but also the likelihood of it being used as a basis 
for condoning similar, but in fact relevantly different undesirable 
practices.133 The slippery slope argument in the context of torture· 
holds that while torture might be justified in the extreme cases, legal-
izing it in these circumstances will invariably lead to torture in other 
less desperate situations. 
This argument is not sound in the context of torture. First, the· 
floodgates are already open-torture is widely used, despite the abso-
lute legal prohibition against it. It is, in fact, arguable that it is the 
existence of an unrealistic absolute ban on torture that has driven tor-
tur~ "beneath the radar screen of accountability"134and that the legal-
ization of torture in very rare circumstances would, in fact, reduce the 
instances of torture because of the increased level of accountability,135 
Second; there is no evidence to suggest that the lawjulviolation of 
fundamental human interests will necessarily lead to a violation of 
fundamental rights where· the pre-conditions for tJ;te activity are 
131. Dershowitz Interview, supra note 2. 
132. [d. (quoting Ken Roth, the executi~e director of Human Rights Watch). It has 
been suggested that Israel ended up torturing around ninety percent of the Palestinian 
security detainees they had until [mally the Israeli Supreme Court outlawed the practice. 
[d.; see also Parry & White, supra note 41, at 757-60. 
J33. For a discussion of the use and persuasiveness of the argument, see KUMAR 
AMAAAsEKARA & MIRKO BAGARIC, EUTHANASIA, MORALITY AND THE LAw ch. 4 (2002). 
134. Dershowitz, supra note 109, at 283. 
135. Dershowitz, for example, has stated, "People say '[o]h my God, thatwill open the 
floodgates.' I say the reverse is true. I believe that would close the floodgates. My view is 
that accountability ... will reduce the amount of torture rather than increase it." Silver, 
supra note 6. 
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clearly delineated and controlled. Thus, in the United States the use 
of the death penalty has not resulted in a gradual extension of the 
offenses for which people may be executed or an erosion in the re-
spect for human life. Third, promulgating the message that the 
"means justifies the ends [sometimes]" is not inherently undesirable. 
Debate can then focus on the precise means and ends that are 
justifiable. 
Conclusion 
The absolute prohibition against torture is morally unsound and 
pragmatically unworkable. There· is a ·need for measured discussion 
regarding the merits of torture as an -information gathering device. 
This would result in the legal use of t~rture in circumstances where 
there are a large number of lives at risk in the immediate future and 
there is no other means of alleviating the threat. While none of the 
recent high profile cases of torture appear to satisfy these criteria, it is 
likely that circumstances will arise in the future where torture is legiti-
mate and desirable. A legal framework should be established to prop-
erly accommodate these situations. 
